Saddam Hussein is one such dictator that fell into American favor in the 1980s. This article seeks to explore the past relations between Saddam and the United States while positing it in an overarching framework of American goals in the region. Our past relations with Saddam lay bare the utter hypocrisy and moral bankruptcy of the justification for the sanctions regime now pummeling ordinary Iraqis.

The Framework

The world is as dependent on hydrocarbons as ever, 65% of proven oil reserves lie in the Middle East with no other region in the world commanding more than 9% of reserves. In short, he that controls the Middle East has enormous strategic advantages in world affairs as was recognized by American planners after World War II. One strategic advantage to US domination of the Middle East is the reliance on foreign oil by its major industrial rivals, Europe and Japan. With reserves in Alaska and the mainland, the US needed to import 53% of its total oil consumption in 1994 compared with 71% for Western Europe and 97% for Japan. (Arming Iraq, p. 4-10)

The United States began to displace Europe as the controlling power in the Middle East during World War II. As early as 1943, US oil companies were coming to Washington to `appeal for financial aid from the government to keep the British at bay and assure "the continuation of a purely American enterprise there [Saudi Arabia] after the war." (The Prize p. 397). The English Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, would complain to President Roosevelt that "there is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has the desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the whole supply of our Navy depends." "To put it bluntly,' he said, some felt "that we are being hustled". (The Prize, p. 401)

Quite possibly the most dramatic showdown between the United States and Europe over Middle Eastern oil occurred during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. Daniel Yergin, in his history of oil, writes that "by 1955, petroleum accounted for two-thirds of all the canal's traffic and in turn, two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it. "Britain had exercised control over Egypt and hence the Suez Canal for three quarters of a century, first by outright invasion and military occupation, then by political and economic dominance over a succession of client regimes." This dominance was soon to be ended with the rise of General Abdel Nasser in Egypt. In April, 1956, Nasser ordered the Egyptian army to seize the canal. (The Prize, p. 480) France, England and Israel began to secretly plot to retake the canal, making one major mistake, however, by excluding the new boss of the region. In October the conspirators put their plans into action, launching attacks on Egypt over a period of several days. "The entire Suez operation came as a surprise to the Americans." President Eisenhower "was absolutely furious". (The Prize, p. 490)

With oil form the canal terminated and mounting embargoes by other Middle Eastern countries, Europe turned to the US to supply the shortfall. None was coming. The United States demanded nothing short of complete withdrawal of British and French forces from Egypt. Yergin writes, "Petroleum would provide the way for Washington to punish its allies in Western Europe" (The Prize, p.491) The British economics minister seeking financial aid in Washington during the crisis would report back to London that he was meeting a "a brick wall at every turn". "The Americans," he added, "seem determined to treat us as naughty boys who have got to be taught that they cannot go off and act on their own without asking Nanny's permission first" (The Prize, p. 497). The operation ended in complete failure for the Europeans as they were displaced from Egypt for good. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan would muse that it was the "rulers in Washington in whose hands all our destinies largely lay." (The Prize, p. 497)

Similar themes were to be played out later. In the early 80s, as part of a plan to diversify their energy sources and decrease reliance on oil, Western Europe proposed to increase substantially their purchase of Soviet gas. "The Reagan Administration opposed the plan because they feared that the expanded imports would give the Soviets political leverage over Europe..." thereby decreasing American influence and increasing Soviet. After Washington banned the export of American technology for the project and then threatened to prohibit European equipment containing American technology to be used, an agreement was reached: Western Europe would limit its purchases from the east to 30% of its total gas purchases and the development of Norway's Troll gas field would be promoted as an alternative. (The Prize, p. 742-43)

It is within this geostrategic framework of increased western dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the understanding that the US holds a powerful political lever over Europe and Japan by dominating the region that we can start to understand the intense US interest in Iraq and the affairs of the Middle East. Let us turn now to the specifics of US interaction with its old friend, Saddam.

The `tilt' Towards Saddam

US support for Iraq has its roots in Nixon's `Twin Pillar' policy. Howard Teicher, a State Department insider, describes the policy as relying on "Iran and Saudi Arabia to serve as the two key protectors of US interests in the Persian Gulf." Iran was more important because of its "geostrategic location adjacent to the Soviet Union, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan; its physical control of the Strait of Hormus; its proven oil reserves, daily production..and the stated willingness of the shah to act aggressively on behalf of American interests wherever they might be threatened." (Twin Pillars, p. 29)

The shah was put firmly in power in 1953 by a CIA orchestrated coup, which overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. By 1963, the United States had supplied the shah with $1.3 billion worth of weapons. During the Nixon Administration Iran would make a major leap forward as an American bulwark in the Middle East with arms sales increasing from $500 million in 1972 to $4.3 billion in 1974. Between 1970 and 1978 the shah ordered $20 billion worth of military equipment accounting for 25% of US arms sales for the period. (Arming Iraq, p.10-12). The only problem with this policy was that despite being militarily strong, the shah was politically weak. The Iranian people rightly viewed the dictator as an American stool pigeon and overthrew him in 1979. The loss of the shah was a major blow to American policy, leaving an anti-American country sitting on an arsenal of high tech weapons. It was this loss of this major regional ally that prompted the American shift towards Iraq as a replacement pillar.

According to Teicher, the "progenitor" of the notion that the "United States should tilt toward Iraq to counterbalance America's lost influence in Iran" was Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor during the Carter Administration. "As early as 1979, in interagency meetings and private discussions...Brzezinski was discreetly floating the idea that perhaps Washington should reconsider its `nonrelationship' with Iraq." (Twin Pillars, p. 61). Five months prior to Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran the "tilt" became more public when Brzezinski editorialized in the New York Times: "We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq...We feel that American-Iraqi relations need not be frozen in antagonism." (With Friends, p. 34).

It appears that rhetoric turned to action in the months prior to the (Iraqi) invasion (of Iran), when the United States provided Jordan and Saudi Arabia with intelligence assessments of Iran's military capability fully aware "that the US assessments would reach Baghdad", Teicher reports. The assessments passed on to Baghdad asserted that Iran's military was in disarray due to purges and lack of replacement parts for its American-made weapons. The implication was that Iran could be quickly defeated. This proved to be untrue as a quick victory for Iraq turned into a decade-long war, claiming the lives of some 700,000 people. (Twin Pillars, p. 103). Iraq's invasion of Iran was not met with the same cries of outrage witnessed a decade later in Kuwait, for the simple reason that American goals and interests were being served. In fact, quite to the contrary, to fight a war one needs guns and money - both of which the United States became quite useful in supplying to the "Beast of Baghdad".

Arming Iraq

At the time of the invasion, Iraq was still on the State Department's list of countries that support terrorism and Washington had no formal diplomatic ties to Baghdad. This made supplying weapons not only difficult but illegal. But there are ways around that and the Reagan Administration did not prove shy in using them. One technique, illustrated in detail by Alan Friedman in his book on the topic, involved the tapping of a nexus of firms owned and operated by ex-CIA mlitary men. These American-based firms would fil the weapons orders for Iraq and ship them to Jordan. Jordan served as a transshipment point for the goods' final destination, Iraq. In this way the goods could have end-user-certificates for Jordan and give the whole operation the appearance of legitimacy. One middle-level man involved in the dealings recalled being advised by a former "Agency man" and lawyer that the word Iraq should be substituted with the word Jordan, "even though we all knew where teh goods were going". (Spider's Web, p. 17)

Another operation involved supplying US cluster bomb technology and the factories to make them to a Chilean arms manufacturer which was selling bombs to Iraq. In late 1983, the company's representatives began shopping for munitions factories that could be shipped to Chile and with the "courtesy of US military a couple of interesting possibilities were made available". After a year of trouble with US customs (military sales to Chile were banned), the sale was reclassified as "scrap metal" by US officials and shipped to Chile. (Spider's Web, p. 48-9)

Diplomatic Support Arrives

In February, 1982, Iraq was removed from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. "Privately though, as the leading Defense Department counter-terrorism official later conceded, `no one had doubts about Saddam's continued involvement with terrorism...The real reason [for taking Iraq off the list] was to help them succeed in the war against Iran." (With Friends, p. 33. The removal of Iraq from the list enabled the Reagan Administration to better aid Saddam in his war effors. Specifically, "it made Iraq eligible to receive US government-backed credits and US military and dual-use technology..."(Arming Iraq, p.34)

Government-backed credits came in the form of loans made through the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation, known as the CCC. The program guaranteed exporters that their loans would be covered in the event that the foreign buyer didn't pay for the products. In February of 1983 "a senior-level group of Reagan Administration officials quietly approved the first $230 million of CCC loan guarantees to cover the shipment to Iraq of American wheat, barley, eggs, rice and feed grains." The initial loans wre handed through the Morgan Guarantee Trust, "the blue-blooded Wall Street institution". (Spider's Web, p. 34) According to a 1990 CIA report, between 1983 and 1990, $4.7 billion had been extended to Iraq from the CCC. (Arming Iraq, p. 37)

Iraq & Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 

Secretary of State Madelaine Albright, in response to a question on why it's ok for other countries to have weapons of mass destruction but not Iraq stated that Saddam has a "proclivity" to use them and that the United States "cannot deal with somebody who is willing to use those weapons of mass destruction on his own people not to speak of his neighbors." While it is true that Saddam has used WMD against Iran and his own people, the United States proved very willing to deal with him. Although evidence of Iraq's use of chemical weapons dates back as early as 1984, the most famous case occurred in 1988, at a town called Halabja in northern Iraq. Its estimated that 5000 Kurds were killed in that single incidence.

Soon after, the Senate passed unanimously Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988 which would ahve imposed tough sanctions against Iraq. The Reagan Administration immediately voiced opposition to the bill and was able to eventually defeat it. A Senate investigation into the gassings concluded that "The Reagan Administration has responded to Iraq's use of poison gas with diplomatic protests...and with tough public talk" but has "been unwilling to take any concrete, punitive action against Iraq." (Senate Report, p.38). The administration argued that sanctions were "premature" and that diplomacy should be tried first. Sanctions also risked being "counterproductive" both to "our effort to maintain a dialogue with the government of Iraq" and more broadly "to our efforts to deal with the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf Region." (With Friends, p. 79)

George Bush and Appeasement

On August 2, 1990 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, thereby putting George Bush in the awkward position of having to convert Saddam from friend to enemy. With the help of the loyal media the transition went rather smoothly as the previous decade-long relationship with Saddam was cast down the memory hole. Bush described the invasion in Hitlerian fashion as a "blitzkrieg". "Appeasement does not work" he declared. "As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors..." "If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms." "Standing up for our principles is an American tradition" we were informed. (NYT 8.9.90) The most well-known act of terror by Saddam occurred at Halabja in 1988. George Bush ascended to the presidency in 1989. In October of that year he signed National Security Directive (NSD) 26. Bruce Jentelson quotes the declassified directive as follows:

"The goal: To achieve `normal relations between the United States and Iraq.' The rationale: `this would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.' The strategy: Use `economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.'" (With Friends. 94)

Yes, apparently appeasement does not work, but George Bush need not conjure up images of 1930s Nazi Germany- his own appeasement of Saddam Hussein would have sufficed.

Conclusion

Iraq is now suffering under quite possibly the most comprehensive sanctions in world history. The official rationale for the sanctions is Saddam's aggressive behavior and insatiable drive to develop weapons of mass destruction. To the contrary, there is a massive, undisputed body of evidence only partially presented here that points to other explanations for US policy towards Iraq. American policy is geared at maintaining control over Arab oil, thereby gaining an immense geostrategic advantage over Europe and Japan and in world affairs in general. Middle East reserves are critical to the functioning of the oil-thirsty western societies and will become even more important as reserves are depleted elsewhere. So what should people concerned about the fate of ordinary Iraqis do? There seems to be unanimous agreement among Iraqis both inside and outside Iraq (excluding those in the pay of the US government) and in the peace movement, that sanctions should be dropped immediately. Americans need to mobilize pressure on the their government to refrain from giving, not only Saddam, but other dictators in the region, the means to carry out their crimes. Aside from that, we should leave the Iraqis to determine their own fate. The United States has neither the moral right nor the competence to meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, most assuredly Iraq

Principle Sources for this Article were:

Bennis, Phyllis and Michael Moushabeck. Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader. (1991)

Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive. 1988

Friedman, Alan. Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq. (1993)

Jentelson, Bruce W. With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam 1982-1990. (1994)

Pythian, Mark. Arming Iraq: How The US And Britain Secretly Built Saddam's War Machine. (1997)

Teichner, Howard and Gayle Radley Teichner. Twin Pillars to Desert Storm. (1993)

Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. (1991)