Translation 2: Book Review of `Notre Ami Ben Ali'

Article Title: Tunisia: TheAuthoritarian Mindset: A book review of Our Friend Ben Ali
Publication: Le Monde
Date: November 5, 1999 (supplement)

an unofficial translation

(more than simply creating a personal portrait of Tunisian President Ben Ali, Nicolas Beau and Jean Pierre Tuquoi have given us a political x-ray of his monopoly on power)

Right from the start, this book's title and preface set the tone. There can be no doubt about it. In no uncertain terms, Nicolaus Beau and Jean Pierre Tuquoi denounce the Tunisian government and the support it enjoys from both Paris and Brussels. Endorsed by Gilles Perrault, Notre Ami Ben Ali belongs the same gender of journalism that Perrault himself inaugurated with such impact a few years ago.⁽¹⁾

The author's blunt style in no way detracts from the truths presented in this disturbing little volume which is far more than just a biting portrait of the Ben Ali era. It is a kind of political x-ray of a regime whose anti-democratic nature has often been poorly understood. The authors do not mince their words describing the governments offensive against human rights and civil liberties, the subordination of the country's media and political organizations, the gutting of the country's civil society. They provide ample supporting facts. The heightened levels of official repression - poorly known to the public - are highlighted. This repression has had as special targets, Islamic fundamentalists. The `anti-fundamentalist' campaign enjoys the support of a good portion of the Tunisian ruling class (des elites tunisiennes) along with their European allies whom together form a kind of `holy alliance' against political and social challenges. Actually, virtually all challenges to the government's authority are branded as `terrorist' or `islamic' threats. In the name of defending `civil society', the relentless repression which first victimized Tunisia's fundamentalists has been extended. A kind of `permanent authoritarianism' permeates Tunisian society today and many of the political and social gains won in the previous 30 years have been reversed. DeTocqueville once wrote `I only know of two ways to create democracy - give everyone rights, or give rights to no one'. The iron hand of the Tunisian government has produced the latter - everyone is equally oppressed.

The situation is becoming clearer. Is the authors' argument fair and if so, how can France tolerate such a dictatorship just two hours flight from Paris? Beau and Tuquoi hold back little. They compare the Tunisian president with Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Milosevic in Yugoslavia. Hard to believe the Tunisian situation has deteriorated to such a level. A true inferno. But although the comparison might be a tad exaggerated, it is still very unsettling to know that there is an authoritarian regime of long-standing in our part of the world (Europe). Knowing the situation, people of good will are obliged to take up the democratic cause. What follows are three relevant themes raised by the authors in this book.

If we are to believe the authors, on seizing power in 1987, Ben Ali had an unusual opportunity (un boulevard s'ouvrait) to move the country in the direction of democratic reform. At the same time after Bourguiba's removal, those who had surrounded him fought to retain their political power and influence. Ben Ali's choice was not ambiguous: democratize the country and purge the old entrenched elements or make alliances with the old order. What Ben Ali chose was to enlarge the government's base of support while modifying its essential structures, which remained in tact. Confronting `islamic fundamentalism' and extending the repression were Ben Ali's methods of solidifying the new social base with the old order. But from the outset the plan didn't work (cette strategie...n'etait pas condamnee au succes). And the more it failed, the more Ben Ali had to resort to increased repression. The results are well known as are the role played by the `holy alliance' (tunisian ruling class and foreign governments - ie. French and US in particular)

The `dilemma' the regime faced in moving towards democracy was how to achieve more political openness without ceding its monopoly on power. There is a popular notion that authoritarianism works irrationally. This is not the case. It also appears that for those in power, they saw their possibilities as essentially being `all or nothing' ie. that they would have to cede political power or monopolize it. To their way of thinking, there was no middle ground.

Couldn't the European Union (EU) have put pressure on the Tunisian authorities to chose a more democratic path? Beau and Tuquoi certainly seemed to support such an approach in calling for pluralistic elections as a precondition for economic cooperation with the EU. They recall the political conditions attached to international economic assistance for Eastern European countries. But, here, let's not expect great things. The European-Mediterranean relationship is based upon a democratic illusion, a scenario that which gives lip service to democratization while accepting authoritarian rule. Democratic values and calls for a civil society are implored but the realities of globalization and regional exchange tend to negate such approaches in practice.

The EU will probably increase its pressure on Tunisia and will get some modest results, most especially in the easing of electoral restrictions of candidates. Such changes are of very small significance. More meaningful change can only come from within Tunisian society itself. To a considerable degree the authors reflect the thinking of the human rights activists who have stood up to the repression. These activitists represent a hope for the future. The book itself has had quite an impact yet it deserves even more serious attention than it has so far enjoyed.

Michel Camau. University Aix-Marseille III