Filed from Tunis on Wednesday, March 1, 2000 by Le Monde's special correspondent, Florence Beaugé

But in recent months, this image has been challenged but what concerns the regime most at this point, is its loss of confidence from ordinary Tunisians. As long as the challenge to power came from an isolated group of intellectuals, human rights organizations or the foreign press, those in power could keep control over those social forces which could more seriously challenge their hegemony: political parties, unions, the press and legal system. But this is no longer the case.

The Riots in the South

The first warning shot `from below' took place on February 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>. Taxi drivers, who interestingly enough have a history of supporting the government, went on strike. Their main grievance was the implementation of new driving regulations and a new point system. Professional drivers were not as much concerned with the new regulations themselves but worried about the zeal with which the police would enforce these new rules (my emphasis- rjp). As one of the strikers explained, `We are already permanently harassed,⁽⁴⁾ but now for the slightest infraction we could lose our licenses or undergo even worse forms of blackmail. This simply wasn't acceptable.' Even before President Ben Ali personally intervened to solve this problem - in favor of the drivers - another crisis broke out:⁽⁵⁾ the southern part of the country.

The rioting by students, joined in some places by the unemployed, lasted 8 to 10 days in early February took place in the regions of Gabes, El Hamma, Gafsa and Sfax. Given the lack of official information, it is difficult to access the scope of this social unrest which was provoked for the most part by rumors of an impending increase in the price of bread.

The Tunisian press did not breath a word about it. One thing is certain: Southern Tunisia, especially the Gafsa and Gabes regions - are going through a difficult period. For seven years this region had enjoyed a considerable amount of business - both legal and extra legal - from its neighbor, Libya. But when the international embargo against Libya was suspended last year, these regions were unable to change gears and reorient their economic life.⁽⁶⁾ Even last year's date harvest disappointed farmers who were suspicious about official statistics suggesting strong results.

Along the same lines, many Tunsians are suspicious of the officially announced inflation rates, which the government claims are at the low level of 2.7%. But the prices for natural gas, water, electricity and transportation have gone up significantly eroding the quality of daily life.

After having dreamed of a higher standard of living and a secure future, ironically many Tunsians find themselves deeply in debt, often bankrupt, their future bleak. These developments bode ill for the south, a region far from the power center (Tunis) and with a tradition of insurgency that goes back far in the country's history, including during the Bourguiba era.

Although Tunisia's middle class has been nothing short of the backbone of the government, its standard of living continues to decline. Up until the present, this middle class accepted government's economic austerity programs as preconditions for programs like the European Union Association Program implemented on July 1, 1998.

Concerning economic adjustments accompanying globalization: again, the population has accepted its terms (those of the IMF rjp) for years without flinching, since it gave the promise of better times. But today people are concerned. "For some time we completely separated the economic and political policies of Tunisia in a completely arbitrary manner. But it isn't working⁽⁷⁾ and now we have ample proof," explains a reputed (but unnamed rjp) economist and university professor.

No Ground Rules

For this professor there is a growing and nagging gap between the processes of economic globalization affecting the country and the absence of democracy in Tunisia's political life. Economic liberalization works according to strict rules, stable institutions and (economic) freedoms, without which the entrepreneurial spirit dies). "But there are no ground rules in Tunisia," this economist emphasizes. "There is only the basest kind of business ethic. Everything is distorted and it affects the system as a whole. We are not only witnessing the withdrawal of the state from all areas of life (ie. the shrinking of the social contract), but the privatization of this state by a clan, one or two families and a political party that monopolizes everything for their own personal gains, discouraging foreign investment. And this is known as well in the north as in the south."

Cronyism and corruption are the two themes that one hears in almost every conversation. If some facts are acknowledged more than others, this matters little to ordinary Tunisian citizens and business people, frustrated from being left out: the system's closed nature in and of itself helps amplify and aggrevate rumors, even the least credible of them.

2. `opacité' suggests lack of openness in French

3. `main de fer'

4. `on est deja racketté en permanence

5. `un autre front s'allumait'

6. In a manner similar to which Jordan has benefitted from the economic embargo against Iraq, for seven years Tunisia reaped profits from the sanctions against Libya. From 1992 through 1999 Libyans were unable to get imports or to use foreign air lines to travel to and fro. They were able to get around this though by making the short trip west to Southern Tunisia to buy the products they needed and make plane connections. Towns like Gabès did a brisk business during this period as did the rest of Tunisia's south. This business softened the structural crisis in Tunisia between the more prosperous north and less economically stable southern regions. Once the economic embargo against Libya was lifted (about a year ago), much of that business dried up, leaving the south once again in difficult straits.

7. `mais cette approach ne tenait pas la route'